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CHINA AND INTERVENTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE*
JEROME ALAN COHENt
As a Chinese proverb says: 'Do not onto others what you
yourself do not desire.' We are against outside interference;
how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of
others? Chou En-lai1
We must give active support to the national independence
liberation movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America as well as to the peace movement and to just strug-
gles in all countries throughout the world. Mao Tse-tung2
Now that the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
into the world community is almost complete, both diplomats and
students of international relations have become aware of the im-
portance of ascertaining Peking's views of international law.S One of
the most fundamental principles of international law is the duty of
states to refrain from unlawful intervention in the affairs of other
states. In the United Nations, where it now represents China, the PRC
will increasingly be called upon to give concrete meaning to the ab-
stractions of the Charter such as article 2 (4) 's prohibition of "the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state," and article 2(7)'s prohibition of UN inter-
vention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state." Also, in establishing bilateral diplomatic
relations with many states since 1970, the PRC has promised on a re-
ciprocal basis to respect the principle of non-intervention as well as
the related principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and
* I am grateful to my colleagues Hungdah Chiu and R. Randle Edwards, Research
Associates at Harvard Law School, for their valuable suggestions and assistance.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1955, Yale University.
I Text of Premier Chou En-Lai's Supplementary Speech at Asian-African Conference,
U.S. CONSULATE GENER.L, HONG KONG, SURVEY OF THE CHxNA MWAmAND PREss, Apr. 20,
1955, at 5-8.
2 Ma Tse-tung, Report to the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party, 1956, reprinted in 4 chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo fa-kuei hui-pen 3 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as FKHP].
a This interest is beginning to be reflected in legal literature. See, e.g., CHINA's
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: S0atE CASE STumrIs (J. Cohen ed. 1972); J. HsIuNG,
LAw AND POLICY iN CINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (1972); HuNGDAH CH u, THE PEOPLE'S
REP BLIc oF CHIA AND THE LAW OF TREAnrs (1972); D. JOHNSTON & HUNGDA CH-U,
AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1967: A CALENDAR (1968);
LAw IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COmmUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (S.C. Leng & H. Chiu eds. 1972); L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (1969).
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peaceful coexistence.' And the landmark Shanghai Communique, pre-
sumably the first step toward the normalization of relations between
the PRC and the United States, pledges Peking and Washington to
non-intervention and the other four principles that comprise the famous
"five principles of peaceful coexistence."5
"Intervention" is, of course, a murky concept. That states influ-
ence each other in many ways and to many degrees is a fact of life.
But the difficulty has been to determine which of the many forms and
degrees of factual intervention may be said to constitute intervention
in the legal sense. When using the term "intervention" care must be
exercised to distinguish between factual intervention and the legal
conclusion that a particular intervention violates authoritative com-
munity expectations about permissible international conduct.' In this
essay, unless the context indicates otherwise, the term is used in the
legal sense.
Unfortunately, the legal concept itself is a slippery vehicle. As
many writers have pointed out, neither states nor jurists have suc-
ceeded in endowing it with an agreed-upon content, and state practice
has only added to the confusion. 7 A traditional definition preferred by
many publicists confines the term to dictatorial interference by a state
in the internal or external affairs of another state, usually involving a
threat or use of military force.8 Although writers and states generally
agree that such interference normally violates state sovereignty and
international law, in practice states have frequently failed to refrain
from intervention even in this limited sense, not to mention coercive
interactions of an economic or ideological nature. This has spurred
the search for exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. As one
authoritative appraisal has summarized the situation:
There has been little agreement as to the special circum-
stances which, exceptionally, may justify intervention. Among
such circumstances suggested by various writers have been
invitation or consent by the state concerned, threats to the
safety of nationals of the intervening state, previous or threat-
4 See, e.g., Text of the Chinese-Japanese Accord Signed by Chou and Tanaka,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1972, at 12, col. 4. For discussion of these principles, which the
PRC has popularized as the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," see text accom-
panying notes 27-29 infra.
5 See Text of US-Chinese Communique, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
6 For a review of the authorities and analysis of the terminological and legal un-
certainties, see Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. 3.
INT'L L. 205, 212 et seq. (1969).
7 See, e.g., A. THo As & A. THowAs, Nox-IxtnvExqitog 67 (1956).
8 See, e.g., id. 68; J. BRIEL Y, LAw or NATONS 402 (6th ed. Waldock 1963);
1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw CHIETLY AS INTEWRETED AND APPLxuE BY T UITr
STATES 245-47 (2d ed. rev. 1945); 1 L. OPPENHEm , INTENATiozAL LAw 305 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1955).
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ened unlawful interventions by the other state, chronic dis-
regard by a state of its international obligations, the needs of
self-defense or self-preservation of the intervening state, and
collective decision to put an end to inhumane treatment by
a government of all or some of its own nationals (humanitarian
intervention). The legal sufficiency of most of these categories
of circumstances as justification for intervention has been
challenged by other writers. The legality of extending armed
assistance to a government at its request against its domestic
opponents remains highly controversial and may not be re-
garded as "intervention" under some definitions. The right of
intervention in exceptional circumstances, if it ever existed,
has been further restricted by the prohibitions on the threat or
use of force contained in the United Nations Charter. It is
generally conceded, however, that collective intervention pur-
suant to the Charter is lawful
The law-making activities of the United Nations have done little
to clarify the situation. For example, on the one hand, the General
Assembly has condemned not only armed intervention but also "all
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the person-
ality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural ele-
ments" and has refused to recognize "for any reason whatever" the
existence of special circumstances that would justify exceptions to
this broad, vague declaration;" on the other hand, other Assembly
resolutions have recommended that all states provide "moral and mate-
rial assistance" to insurgent movements that seek to liberate from
colonialism the peoples of African territories under Portuguese ad-
ministration and of South-West Africa." The behavior of individual
states has often been characterized by a similar ambivalence toward
intervention.'
What is the PRC's understanding of "intervention"? How has
it applied the concept? Does Peking's practice square with its theory?
How does the Chinese record compare with that of other states? To
what extent does it reflect autochthonous Chinese experience? What
have PRC scholars and ideologists written on the subject? In sum,
what is Peking's endorsement of the principle of non-intervention
likely to be worth?
This introductory essay surveys these important but seldom
treated questions of new China's attitude toward international law.
After first sketching some historical background, it will examine the
9W. FRamD=AN, 0. Lissinz & R. PUGH, INTERnATiONAL LAW 971 (1969).
10 Delearation on the Inadvisability of Intervention Into the Domestic Affairs of
States, GA. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965).
1 1 S ee the resolutions quoted and discussed in Moore, supra note 6, at 267.
12 See id. 243.
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concept of intervention articulated in PRC legal literature, the appli-
cations of the concept by the government, press and scholars of
China, Peking's view regarding the applicability of non-intervention
to relations among socialist states, and its efforts to reconcile its ad-
vocacy of non-intervention with its attempts to influence events in
other countries through a variety of means including support for se-
lected "wars of national liberation."
I. HiSTORICAL BACKGROUND
Chinese leaders have been concerned with the rules governing
intervention in internal affairs almost since the beginning of recorded
time. From the eighth to the third centuries B.C., during the latter
part of China's pre-imperial history, there existed in the present north-
central part of China a number of feudal states which, although
nominally vassals of the Chou dynasty, largely functioned as inde-
pendent entities. These feudal states developed a rough system of
commonly accepted norms, institutions, and processes for the conduct
of their relations. Some aspects of that system, like certain aspects
of the system that regulated the interaction of the city-states of ancient
Greece, bear a striking similarity to the international law that emerged
from the multi-state system of fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe.
The rules relating to intervention provide a case in point.
In pre-imperial China it was generally accepted that each of the
feudal states had a right to manage its own affairs and had a corre-
sponding duty not to interfere in the affairs of other feudal states.13
Nevertheless, this general principle was frequently honored in the
breach, and there developed a variety of rationalizations for departures
from the norm. Strong, self-righteous leaders who were attracted to
intervention as a means of seeking various ends purported to find
justification in prevailing ethical doctrines that preached the desir-
ability of the less worthy submitting to the virtuous. Moreover, excep-
tions to the rule of non-intervention came to be recognized during
China's pre-imperial era. The most obvious of these authorized inter-
vention if necessary to the self-preservation of the intervening state.
Another frequently-invoked exception permitted intervention against
a ruler who oppressed his own people. Also popular was the claim
that intervention was a necessary sanction against a feudal state that
had failed to carry out its obligations under a treaty. And in many
instances one feudal state used military means to install a friendly
sovereign on the throne of a neighbor.
13This paragraph is based on Te-hsu Ch'eng, International Law in Early China
(1122-249 B.C.), 11 CHnrsE SocALs & PoL. SCL REv. 44-46 (1927).
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The establishment of the Chinese empire and its gradual expan-
sion over a vast land mass and population required continuing atten-
tion to the manner in which China would deal with neighboring
peoples who were not under its direct control. Throughout most of two
millennia from the founding of the empire in 221 B.C. until the onslaught
of Western military expeditions in the nineteenth century, the Chinese
emperor served as overlord of what came to be known as the tribute
system. This was a rather loose hierarchy of tributary peoples in
which status was relative to the degree of acceptance of Confucian
cultural, ethical, political, and social norms and of China's writing
system and agricultural practices. An elaborate series of rituals gov-
erned contacts between the "Son of Heaven" in the Chinese capital
and lesser rulers. These lesser rulers acquired legitimacy, at least in
Chinese eyes, only after investiture by the Chinese emperor and peri-
odically sent emissaries to pay tribute to him and to receive mag-
nanimous gifts from him in return. The hierarchical organization and
protocol of the Sinocentric East Asian community were designed to
acknowledge not only the preeminent power of China, whose name
means "Central Realm," but also its moral superiority as the embodi-
ment of virtues deserving of universal application.14
Underlying the imperial tribute system was the theory that
China could "intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary
because the Chinese emperor was responsible for all the peoples under
Heaven and because their rulers were viewed as his appointed repre-
sentatives.1 15 This normally latent right of intervention was occa-
sionally exercised. For example, in 1788 China sent a military expedi-
tion to Vietnam to restore to the throne the L8 family, who, until a
recent rebellion, had been loyal tributaries of the empire for over a
century. A scholarly analysis has concluded:
The relationship was not between two equal states.
There was no doubt in anyone's mind that China was the
superior and the tributary state the inferior. The Vietnamese
Kings clearly realized that they had to acknowledge China's
suzerainty and become tributaries in order to avoid active
intervention by China in their internal affairs . . . .It was
in the interest of the Vietnamese Kings to surrender part of
their sovereignty in return for the assurance that in case of
rebellion they would be protected by China and that in time of
14 See, e.g., THE CmuE WORLD ORDER (J.K. Fairbank ed. 1968) (especially Fair-
bank, A Preliminary Framework, in id. 1). For general historical perspective, see, e.g.,
J. FAmI iR, E. RsmcnAuER & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA, THE MODEM TRANSFORUATION
(1965); E. REISCHAUER & J. FAIRBANx, EAST AsIA, ThE GREAr TRADITION (1960).
1ITruong Buu Lam, Intervention Versus Tribute In Sino-Vietnamese Relations,
1788-1790, in THE C=Enss WORLD ORDER 165, 179 (J.K. Fairbank ed. 1968).
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internal peace they would not be conquered and directly ad-
ministered by China.1"
Western force rudely awakened China to the fact that, beyond the
tributary peoples of East Asia, lay powerful nation-states with a pro-
foundly different view of society, government, and international rela-
tions. In the nineteenth century, a series of wars humiliated China
and shattered its millennial isolation. The Western "barbarians" were
bent on opening up China and compelling it to participate in the
Western state system. The onerous and comprehensive restraints that
they and later their emulators-the Japanese-imposed upon China
transformed that proud and long powerful country into a semi-
colony. Besides losing substantial portions of its territory, as well as
control over its tributary states, China was made to suffer an elaborate
structure of extraterritorial privileges, inequitable tariff restrictions,
"leased territories," foreign concessions and settlements, foreign armed
forces, and foreign railway, postal, customs, wireless, and other ad-
ministrative networks.
In reaction to this unhappy experience, modern Chinese patriots
of all political persuasions have sought to liberate their country from
foreign domination in order, in the words of Sun Yat-sen, "to obtain
the rights of a civilized state" and "to place China in a respectable
place in international society.""' In these circumstances they have un-
derstandably taken an active interest in the rules of intervention that
the world community purports to apply. Prior to its ouster from the
UN in 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan participated in both
multilateral and bilateral efforts to strengthen support for the principle
of non-intervention. 9
The leaders of the People's Republic of China have been so sen-
sitive to the history of foreign domination that they have manifested
an almost obsessive concern with vindicating and preserving national
sovereignty. 0 Actually, although its ranks have recently been deci-
mated by internecine strife and the ravages of time, it is still true
16Id. 178.
1
7
See, e.g., W. TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN PowERs (1970).
18 
I pORTANT DocuENTS RELATING TO CHNA'S REvoL-uTION, 1912, at 67-68 (Shang-
hai ed. 1912).
19See, e.g., 20 U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm. 267, U.N. Doc. A/c.1/SR1398 (1965) (state-
ment of Taiwan government supporting the Declaration on the Inadvisability of Inter-
vention Into the Domestic Affairs of States, supra note 10); Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance Between the Republic of China and the USSR, Aug. 14, 1945, art. V, T~Tpss
BETwEE THE REPUBLIC or CwINA m FOREIGN STATES (1927-1957) 506 (edited by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Taipei 1958).
20 See, e.g., Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law-and Our Own, in
CoNMr ORARY CMU E LAW: REs_.RcE PROBLEMs AND PERSPEcTIVES 282, 284-85
(J. Cohen ed. 1970).
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that to the present Chinese Communist elite-and especially to Mao
Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and other senior leaders-foreign domination
is not "history" but the reality with which they have had to struggle
continuously for a half-century, first as revolutionaries and later as
rulers.
For example, Communist victory in the civil conflict that was re-
newed shortly after the end of World War II only briefly terminated
American military aid to the overthrown Nationalist government. When
the Korean conflict broke out, the United States resumed military
aid to Chiang Kai-shek's remnant forces on Taiwan, used the Seventh
Fleet to prevent Communist reintegration of the island with the Chinese
mainland, and subsequently concluded a military alliance with the
Nationalists that continues to this day2 1- Taiwan has not been the
PRC's sole experience with foreign interference. Peking bitterly re-
sented the covert efforts of other governments to support the 1959
revolt in Tibet as well as their overt condemnation of China for sup-
pressing it?2 Peking also appeared to interpret American participation
in the Korean conflict as ultimately directed toward intervention in
China 3 And it has had to protect itself against the perennial problem
of foreign-sponsored espionage and sabotage.24
Nor has bourgeois imperialism been Peking's only source of con-
cern. Even in the ostensibly friendly days of the early 1950's, the PRC
had to apply considerable and persistent pressure against the Soviet
Union in order to liquidate certain naval bases and economic conces-
sions that the USSR sought to retain in China and to eliminate Soviet
interference in affairs of the Chinese Communist Party and govern-
ment.25 And during the past decade Peking has accused Moscow of
seeking to stir up rebellion among minority nationalities who live on
the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet border, of continuing its inter-
ference in Chinese politics, of engaging in overt acts of aggression
against Chinese territory, and of planning to turn China into another
Czechoslovakia. 0
2 1 See, e.g., Cohen, Recognizing China, FoRaErx A:FAis, Oct., 1971, at 30, 35-36.
22 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 35-38 infra; H. HNTor, Coz-rUNIsT CHINA
IN Woa LD Porincs 285-89 (1966).
23 For authoritative interpretation of these events, see T. Tsou, AaxaucA's FAjURim
n C=iNA, 1941-1950, at 555-91 (1963); A. WHrnmG, CiNA CROSSES THE Y iu 151-62
(1960).
24 See, e.g., judgment of Military Tribunal on U.S. Spies in the Arnold-Baumer
Espionage Case, PEoPL 's C3NA (Supp.), Dec. 16, 1954, at 3-5; Judgment of Military
Tribunal on U.S. Spies in the Downey-Fecteau Case, id. 6-8. See also Cohen, Chinese
Law and Sino-American Trade, in CiNA TRADE PRosPEcTS Axm U.S. POLICY 145-46
(A. Eckstein ed. 1971).
25 See, e.g., J. Hs=oNG, supra note 3, at 54-55.
26See text preceding note 69 infra. See also Lin Piao, Report to the Ninth
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II. EsPousAL OF NON-INTERVENTION
This abiding preoccupation with foreign intervention has led the
Chinese government to endorse the principle of non-intervention in
international law. Indeed, "mutual non-interference in each other's
internal affairs" became the third of Peking's five principles of peace-
ful coexistence.27 Almost one year after the Sino-Indian agreement of
1954 articulated the "five principles," they were elaborated into ten
principles by the Asian-African Conference that was held in Bandung.
The Joint Communique issued by the PRC and twenty-eight other
states not only called for "abstention from intervention or interference
in the internal affairs of another country," but also urged "abstention
by any country from exerting pressures on other countries" and "re-
fraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any country." The
Joint Communique pledged "Respect for the right of each nation to
defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations," but it declared that collective defense arrange-
ments should not "serve the particular interests of any of the big pow-
ers."28 With a number of Afro-Asian states the PRC subsequently
concluded bilateral friendship treaties that explicitly incorporated the
"five principles," and some treaties also referred to the "ten principles"
laid down at Bandung. 9
Although the quantity of scholarship on international law pro-
duced in the PRC has not rivaled the substantial body of literature
developed in the Soviet Union, a number of Chinese essays have dealt
with intervention. A few have discussed the subject in an overall way,
while others have focused on specific incidents.
In elucidating the meaning of "peaceful coexistence" shortly after
the Bandung conference, Professor Chou Keng-sheng, one of China's
leading legal commentators, acknowledged that the principle of non-
intervention is part of the traditional fabric of international law and
stated that article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter reinforces that
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in Pxmo Rviaw (Special Issue),
Apr. 28, 1969, at 28.
2 7 See Agreement Between India and China on Trade and Intercourse Between
Tibet Region of China and India, Apr. 29, 1954, 299 U.N.T.S. 57, 70 (1958).
28 Joint Communique of Bandung Conference, U.S. CONSuLATE GENERAL, HONG
KONG, SuRvaY oF = CHNA MAuNLANn PRnss, Apr. 23, 1955, at 11, 16-17.
29 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship Between the People's Republic of China and the
Republic of Ghana, Aug. 18, 1961, reprinted in Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo yu-hao
t'iao-yiieh chi [Collection of Friendship Treaties Concluded by the People's Republic
of China] 63 (edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of
China, Peking 1965).
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principle ° Following the lead of Soviet scholars, who exercised major
influence over Chinese writing on international law in the 1950's,
Professor Chou inveighed against taking a formal, mechanical view of
what constitutes intervention. He cited Stalin for the proposition that
intervention can take many forms-military, economic, and subversive.
Sometimes, he noted, intervention parades in the garb of "non-inter-
vention," as in the case of the British, French, and other Western
powers' "indirect aggression" through refusal to interfere in the
Spanish Civil War, thereby allegedly causing the overthrow of the
Republican Government. More recently, he maintained, the Western
imperialists, out of ostensible respect for the principle of non-inter-
ference in internal affairs, wrongfully refused to submit for discussion
at the UN "questions of racial conflict and national self-determination
which obviously possess international importance." As examples of
such distortions of the UN Charter, he mentioned the questions of the
Union of South Africa's treatment of its Indian population and
France's control of Algeria.3
In a comprehensive article written in 1960, after the UN General
Assembly had condemned China's suppression of the 1959 revolt in
Tibet, scholar Yi Hsin did not bemoan the UN's failure to act in cases
of racial discrimination and suppression of self-determination. Along
the lines set forth in Soviet scholarship, he analyzed the historical
evolution of the rule of non-intervention, and classified and criticized
the exceptions to which bourgeois international law has subjected it.
Among these he included resort to intervention in the guise of non-
intervention. Yet what he emphasized was the great extent to which
imperialism interfered in internal affairs when it should not have,
rather than the extent to which it failed to act when it should have.
By way of illustration, Yi referred to many concrete cases, using
China's experience wherever possible. For example, he stated:
The people of our country have personally experienced the
intervention and aggression of imperialist countries on the
pretext of protecting their nationals, and there are indeed too
many cases to enumerate. During the period of the Chinese
Revolution, when the Northern Expedition Forces captured
Nanking in 1927, in order to obstruct the Chinese Revolution
30u2. CHARTER art. 2(7) provides in part: "Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... "
31 Chou Keng-sheng, The Principle of Peaceful Coexistence From the Viewpoint of
International Law, 1955(6) CKENG-FA YE,-Cmur 37, 41 [hereinafter cited as PoLiTicAT-
LEGAL Rrsmacs].
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through the use of arms, the English, American and other im-
perialists ordered their warships to shell Nanking on the
ground that their nationals and consulates were 'encroached
upon and harmed by rioters.' As a result, more than two thou-
sand Chinese soldiers and civilians were wounded or killed and
the loss of houses and property was considerable. Immedi-
ately afterwards, the United States, England, Japan, France,
and Italy further discussed plans for sending troops to inter-
vene and lodged an ultimatum with the National Government
in Wuhan, demanding the prosecution of criminals, apology,
and indemnity and making other unreasonable demands. In
1928, when the Northern Expedition Forces entered Tsinan,
Japan even declared that in order to 'protect Japan's rights
and interests' it was sending troops to Shantung. On May 3,
Japan massacred more than three thousand Chinese soldiers
and civilians and cruelly murdered the Chinese special diplo-
matic commissioner, Ts'ai Kung-shih.
With respect to intervention in order to quell revolution that threatens
imperialist interests in a country, Yi claimed that the United States had
"illegally occupied our territory, Taiwan, by force of arms . . . on
the pretext of a 'collective self-defense.' ,8 To demonstrate inter-
vention in the interest of maintaining "the balance of power," he re-
called how Russia, Germany and France forced Japan to return the
Liaotung peninsula to China in 1895 and how in 1899 the United
States demanded an "open door" policy in China8
To illustrate the "class character" of the "humanitarian interven-
tion" practiced by the imperialist states, Yi Hsin referred to the then
recent concern over Tibet.
The term 'humanity' professed in bourgeois international
law means bourgeois humanity. Imperialism considers as 'in-
humane' those countries in which the proletariat has political
power and establishes a dictatorship over the reactionary
forces. It considers as 'inhumane' the punishment and sup-
pression imposed by the people of a country upon conspira-
torial elements who engage in rebellion and subversive
activities supported by imperialism. . . . When a country
adopts certain progressive measures in internal affairs which
reflect the demands of the people but which are unfavorable
to the minority, the originally privileged class, imperialism
also considers it 'inhumane.' In all these cases, imperialism
considers it permissible to intervene. Moreover, in order to
achieve its object, which cannot be publicly announced, im-
82yj Hsin, What Does Bourgeois International Law Explain About the Question of
Intervention?, 4 Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-chiu [Research on International Problems] 47, 49
(1960).
33 Id. So.
8 4 Id.
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perialism can even fabricate the pretext of 'humanitarianism'
in order to intervene. The Chinese suppression of the rebellion
of the upper stratum of the Tibetan reactionary clique sup-
ported by reactionaries of foreign countries, and the demo-
cratic reform of the Tibet region, enabling the liberation of a
million or more Tibetan compatriots from the dark and cruel
serf system, brought a shout from imperialism, which ca-
lumniated the measures as 'violations of human rights' and
'genocide.' Obviously, behind all the shouting is an eager con-
spiracy of intervention."
According to Yi Hsin, the General Assembly's "so-called resolu-
tion on 'the Tibet question'" was the product of American manipula-
tion of the principles of non-intervention embodied in article 2 (7) of
the UN Charter. He lashed out against bourgeois jurists who "follow
their master and do their best to bark like dogs who hear sounds and
see shadows." 6 He maintained that Lauterpacht's Oppenkeim, for
example, had sought to argue that since "human rights and funda-
mental freedoms have become a persistent feature of the Charter they
may have ceased to be a matter which is essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of States.137 And, he claimed, other scholars had put them-
selves in the service of organizations such as "the so-called 'Inter-
national Commission of Jurists,'" which had issued a report on the
Tibet question that was "full of rumors and slander for the purpose of
fabricating an international legal basis for intervention
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE
Like their Soviet counterparts, most Chinese writers have been
reluctant to engage in close analysis of the complex issues implicit in the
law of intervention. 9 They too have preferred to discuss specific inci-
dents after the fact rather than to develop a rationale for principled
decisionmaking that might constrict their government's freedom of
action or produce an embarrassing and personally hazardous disagree-
ment between scholar and government. This became clear by the late
1950's, as a brief comparison of Chinese views on the cases of Hungary
and Lebanon suggests.
Following the lead of the PRC and the official voice of the Chinese
Communist Party, the People's Daily, Chinese specialists in interna-
35 Id.
361d. 51.
37Id., quoting 1 L. OPPENumm, IwEATioxAL LAw 280 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1948).
38yi Hsin, supra note 32, at 0-51.
3 9 For the views of Soviet writers, see, e.g., Butler, Soviet Attitudes Toward Inter-
vention, to be published in LAw AmD Civn WAR or T=E MODERN Woarw U. Moore ed.).
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tional law supported the Soviet Union's military suppression of the
1956 Hungarian revolution on the ground that the USSR had acted
at the request of the lawful Hungarian government. As Ch'en T'i-
ch'iang, one of the most prominent scholars, put it: "Acts of interven-
tion in a state with the consent of the government of that state cannot
be considered [illegal] intervention."40 Other scholars shared this
rationale.41 Two years later, however, after the PRC condemned the
entry of American forces into Lebanon as "armed intervention in the
Lebanon's [sic] internal affairs," '42 Chinese scholars dutifully agreed,
despite the fact that the President of Lebanon had requested the entry
of American forces. Citing Khrushchev as authority, Professor Chou
Keng-sheng, who was frequently called upon to justify the Chinese
Government's position in international legal questions," handled the
problem this way:
The traitorous government of Chamoun, opposed by the
people of Lebanon, had to appeal to a foreign state to dis-
patch forces to maintain its shaky rule and therefore it obvi-
ously cannot be considered as a government representing the
Lebanese people. . . . As a matter of fact, the speaker of the
Lebanese Parliament had called on the United Nations to
request the United States to withdraw its forces; this was, on
behalf of the Lebanese people, a repudiation of Chamoun's
appeal. Moreover, Chamoun's appeal itself is illegal, because
to invite the colonialists to engage in armed intervention in
the internal affairs of a state is to betray the independence
of that state.4
Indeed, in dealing with the Hungarian case, the People's Daily,
unlike the scholars who discussed the case, had taken care to empha-
size that Soviet actions were "entirely just" not only because they had
been taken "in conformity with the Warsaw Treaty, and at the request
of the Hungarian Government to assist in restoring order, but also
40 Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, The Hungarian Incident and the Principle of Non-Intervention,
Kuang-ming jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Apr. 5, 1957, at 1; cf. Refuting the Loud
Western Outcry Over the "Hungarian Issue," Jen-min jih-pao [hereinafter cited as
People's Daily], Nov. 14, 1956, at 1, col. 1.
41 See Sun Nan, What is the Principle of Non-intervention in Other Nations' Internal
Affairs?, 74 ExTRAcTs FROm CmHNA MANLAND MAl;AZNES, Mar. 18, 1957, at 1-3; Tien
Pao-shen, Is the Dispatch of [the] Soviet Army to Hungary an "Intervention" in Other
Nations' Internal Affairs?, 76 ExTRAcTs FROX CIIINA MAINLAND MAGAZINES, Apr. 1, 1957,
at 1-3.
4 2 The Chinese Government Demands Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Lebanon,
Withdrawal of British Forces from Jordan, PERING REv Ew, Jul. 22, 1958, at 7.
43See Cohen & Shao-chuan Leng, The Sino-Indian Dispute Over the Internment
and Detention of Chinese Nationals, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OP INTEwRATIONAL LAW: SolE
CAsE STuDIES 268, 289 et seq. (J. Cohen ed. 1972).
44 Chou Keng-sheng, Don't Allow American and British Aggressors to Intervene in
the Internal Affairs of Other States, (1958) 4 PoL 'CAL-LEGAL RESEARcR 3-4.
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because that request coincided with the genuine desires of the Hun-
garian people." The revolt in Hungary had not been a "spontaneous
mass action, but one imposed on the Hungarian people by a gang of
conspirators, instigated by the United States and other Western
countries.",4 5
Thus, when foreign troops enter another state at the request of
the government of that state in order to assist in restoring order,
Peking's opinion of the legality of this action turns upon whether, in
its view, "that request coincides with the genuine desires of the . . .
people." This, of course, permits the PRC to decide the legal question
on the basis of political expediency, and that is precisely what it has
continued to do. In 1969, for example, it condemned the "clique" of
Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand--"merely a bunch of lackeys fed
by U.S. imperialism"-for "saying that the U.S. aggressor forces had
been invited by it to 'help' cope with the revolutionary forces of Thai-
land."" Similarly the PRC has condemned as aggression the actions of
American combat forces in Vietnam at the request of the Republic of
Vietnam
7
Between the Hungarian and Lebanese cases, of course, Chairman
Mao had launched one of his periodic major domestic campaigns
against intellectuals-the "anti-rightist" movement of 1957-after
which a number of scholars of international law ceased publishing.
Interestingly for our purposes, a principal reason offered for the purge
of scholar Ch'en T'i-ch'iang was his failure to assert that the legality
of intervention by invitation rests upon whether the invitation "coin-
cides with the genuine desires of the.., people." Ch'en was accused of
having adopted an "anti-Party, anti-socialist position" because his
justification of Soviet actions in the Hungarian "incident" had been un-
critically broad. He had endorsed the traditional view of most scholars
and statesmen that if, during a civil war, a foreign state responds to a
widely-recognized government's request for military assistance against
the insurgents, the action of the foreign state is legal even though the
government has ruled in a manner contrary to the interests of its
4 5 Refuting the Loud Western Outcry Over the "Hungarian Issue," People's Daily,
Nov. 14, 1956, at 1, col. 1. It should be noted that the United States claimed that the
insurrection which had occurred in Lebanon some two months prior to President
Chamoun's request for American military forces had been encouraged and strongly
supported by Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet Union. See, e.g., 5 M. WHmEw, DIGEST Or
INTERATIONAL LAW 826-27, 1169-70 (1965).
4 6 The Face of a Traitor, People's Daily, Jan. 25, 1969, translated in PEKWno RE-IEW,
Feb. 21, 1969, at 14.
47 See text accompanying note 84 infra.
48For analysis of the implications of the "anti-rightist" movement for legal scholar-
ship and the administration of justice in China, see J. Comm, THE CammNA. PRocEss
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 14-17 (1968).,
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people 9 Obviously, he had written, such foreign aid could provoke
the anger of the people; nevertheless, even if the revolutionary forces
succeeded in establishing a new government, the foreign state could
not be deemed legally accountable for its action. It would only have
earned the political ill-will of the new government.50
Ch'en's critics pointed out the implications of his view for China's
civil war. They argued:
Ch'en T'i-ch'iang is supporting the following proposition:
American imperialism does not bear legal responsibility for
aiding the Chiang Kai-shek clique in fighting the civil war
and in suppressing the revolutionary movement of the Chinese
people. There is simply ill-will on the part of the Chinese
people. In other words, from Ch'en T'i-ch'iang's point of view,
such acts by American imperialism do not violate international
law.5
1
Obviously, they concluded, American imperialism had committed il-
legal intervention in China "and only those rightists who breathe out of
imperialism's nostrils would say that it cannot result in legal respon-
sibility and simply results in political ill-wil."
s2
Ch'en's other publications do not portray a man who consciously
sought to "breathe out of imperialism's nostrils." Indeed, he frequently
articulated the legal bases for the PRC's protests against imperialist
attempts to intervene in Chinese affairs. Early in 1956, for example,
a Nationalist Chinese jet fighter plane that had been harassing the
mainland landed in Hong Kong after having been pursued by Com-
munist Chinese air defense forces. The PRC demanded that the
United Kingdom, which recognized it as the sole government of China
and which did not recognize a state of belligerency in China, detain
both plane and pilot. When the British permitted the pilot to return
to Taiwan and were preparing to release the plane as well, the PRC
Foreign Ministry lodged a protest, and Ch'en T'i-ch'iang swiftly sup-
ported his government in an article that appeared in the People's Daily.
Drawing upon Lauterpacht's Oppenheim,53 the draft convention
adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900,54 and espe-
4 9 For discussion of both the traditional view and the developing minority view
that in a civil conflict foreign assistance to both sides should be prohibited, see Moore,
supra note 6, at 245-46, 272 et seq.
5 0 See Ch'en Ti-ch'iang, supra note 40.
51 Ho Wu-shuang & Ma Chin, A Criticism of the Reactionary Viewpoint of Ch'en
T'i-c'iang on the Science of International Law, 1957(6) POLrriCAL--LEGAL REssirc
35, 38.
5 2 Id. 38.
5 3 See note 37 supra.
54 Droits et devoirs des puissances itranggres et leurs ressortissants, au cas de
mouvement insurrectionnel, envers les gouvernernents itablis ct reconnus qui sont aux
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cially the 1928 Havana "Convention on the Duties and Rights of States
in the Event of Civil Strife,"" he claimed that the British government
had violated its "obligation not to allow the area under its administra-
tion to be turned into a base to conduct hostile activities against the
government of a foreign country with which it is at peace.""6 Ch'en
maintained that by allowing pilot and plane to return to Taiwan,
Britain was permitting renewal of their hostile activities against
China, and this constituted an international delinquency.
Actually, Ch'en's fall from grace appears to have been caused
not so much by his specific views on intervention as by his general
outlook. He apparently spoke frankly in the spring of 1957 during
the movement to "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools
contend," when Chairman Mao induced many intellectuals to help
"rectify" the Party by offering criticisms.57 During this brief period of
free speech, Ch'en, who, until his subsequent dismissal as a "rightist,"
served as head of the Division of International Law of the Institute of
International Relations of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was said
to have "even proposed the reactionary view of the necessity of
studying Anglo-American law.""8 Ch'en had been educated at the
University of London and in 1951 had published his doctoral disserta-
tion on the law of recognition under the auspices of the London Insti-
tute of World Affairs."9 This professional training seems to have led
him astray in new China, for during the "anti-rightist" movement he
was attacked as one of "the old international law jurists, who still ad-
here to the purely legalistic viewpoint" that fails to recognize that
international law is simply a legal instrument in the service of country,
socialism and peace, to be used when useful but discarded when dis-
advantageous. 60
IV. "SocIALIST INTERNATIONALISM," NoW-INTERVENTION AND
THE SINo-SovIET SPLIT
In the mid-1950's, in an effort to gain greater equality in China's
relations with the Soviet Union, the PRC attempted to modify the
prises avec l'insurrection, Sept. 8, 1900, in 18 ANNT ADE DE L'nsTnrr D DRorr IN=-
NATIONAL 181 (1900).
65 46 Stat. 2749 (1928) ; T.S. No. 814.
Ge Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, We Cannot Allow Hong Kong To Be Used As A Base For
Hostile Activities Against the Mainland, People's Daily, Mar. 19, 1956, at 3.
57 See J. CoHN, supra note 48, at 14.
GsLin Hsin, On the Systems of International Law After the Second World War,
I Chiao-hslleh yUi yen-chiu [Teaching and Research] 34, 38 (1958).
59 CH'sE T'i-cixH'xO, THE INTEATiONAL LAW or REC 0GwTION (1951).
60 Chu Li-lu, Refute Ch'en T'i-ch'iang's Absurd Theory Concerning International Law,
People's Daily, Sept. 18, 1957, at 3. For details of the similar attack on scholars of
domestic law during the anti-rightist movement, see Cohen, The Chinese Communist
Party and "Judicial Independencd': 1949-1959, 82 HMv. L. REv. 967, 989-93 (1969).
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doctrine of "socialist internationalism," often called "proletarian inter-
nationalism," which Stalin had developed as a rationale for maintaining
Soviet primacy over and interference in other Communist states.61
Peking sought to obtain a Soviet admission that the "five principles of
peaceful coexistence" were applicable not only to relations between
socialist states and non-socialist states but also to relations between
socialist states themselves. The high point of this effort came with the
Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1956, that the policy of peaceful co-
existence "finds its most profound and consistent expression in the
mutual relations between the socialist countries" and that "the Soviet
Government is ready to discuss, together with the governments of
other socialist states, measures . . . to remove the possibilities of
violating the principle of national sovereignty and . . . equality."
62
The PRC promptly announced that the Soviet Declaration, which had
been stimulated by the unfavorable reaction to the initial use of
Soviet troops against the Hungarian revolt, was "of great importance
in correcting errors in mutual relations between the socialist coun-
tries and in strengthening unity among them.""3 When the USSR
brutally suppressed that revolt shortly thereafter, Chinese writers
claimed that this did not violate the Declaration because "the action
of the Soviet army was entirely in the interest of the Hungarians,
64
being designed "to assist Hungary in safeguarding democratic rights,
the fruit of socialist construction and the people's lives and security,
in accordance with the spirit of solidarity and cooperation between
brother countries." 6
The PRC subsequently ceased insisting that the "five principles
of peaceful coexistence" be made applicable to relations within the
Soviet bloc, but it continued to seek a redefinition of "socialist inter-
nationalism" that would not violate the national independence and
equality of other socialist countries.66 This doctrine, as vague as
"peaceful coexistence," was said to have a distinctive content that
described the superior standards that were supposed to prevail in rela-
tions between socialist states. The standards sought by Peking called
61 For an excellent account of this intricate, unobtrusive effort, see J. HsIumN, supra
note 3, at 49-61.
62 Declaration of the U.S.S.R. On the Foundation for the Development and Further
Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other
Socialist States, October 30, 1956, Soviet News (London), Oct. 31, 1956, at 1-2.
63Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Declara-
tion by the Government of the Soviet Union on October 30, 1956, November 1, 1956,
PEoPLE's C='NA (Supp.), Nov. 16, 1956, at 1-2.
64 Sun Nan, supra note 41.
65 Tien Pao-shen, supra note 41.
66 See J. HsrUNG, supra note 3, at 62.
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not only for the full equality of socialist states but also for the com-
radely mutual assistance that was said to be the hallmark of the
socialist bloc. 7 By the early 1960's, however, with Sino-Soviet unity
virtually at an end, the PRC obviously realized that the generality of
the principles of socialist internationalism continued to permit the
USSR to manipulate them to achieve its own national objectives
within the socialist camp and that "mistakes" and "neglect" of the
principle of equality among nations were likely to persist unless mea-
sures were taken to specify a code of conduct for the socialist countries.
In 1962, for example, before the Sino-Soviet dispute reached the
level of open polemics, the then Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister
Ch'en Yi implicitly lectured the USSR on "the common principles
guiding the mutual relations between socialist countries," principles
which "are entirely different from those adopted by the imperialist
countries." A socialist country, he said at the Bulgarian Embassy in
Peking, does not engage in subversive activities, does not try to impose
its will on other countries, does not use economic aid to disguise inter-
vention, does not indefinitely maintain military bases and troops
abroad, does not enmesh other countries in military pacts that get
others to pull its chestnuts out of the fire, does not undermine the
peace and neutrality of other countries, and does not suppress na-
tional liberation movements."" In the circumstances of the time it did
not require much imagination on the part of Bulgaria and other social-
ist states to question whether the Soviet Union measured up to these
standards of proletarian internationalism.
Shortly after Ch'en Yi's speech, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated
to the point that each side abandoned veiled references in favor of
more specific indictments. China's leaders charged their Soviet counter-
parts with having "arbitrarily infringed the sovereignty of fraternal
countries, interfered in their internal affairs, carried on subversive
activities and striven in every way to control fraternal countries." The
Soviet elite, it was claimed, sought to turn fraternal countries into eco-
nomic appendages and constantly brought political, economic, and
military pressure to bear on them. Drawing particularly on the ex-
periences of Albania and China, the Chinese accused their erstwhile
elder brothers of openly attempting to overthrow the leadership of
other fraternal countries. "Such measures which gravely worsen state
relations are rare even between capitalist countries," they said. 9
67 Id. 57-64.
68 Gudding Principles for Relations between Socialist Countries, PEIG REVIEw,
Sept. 14, 1962, at 11.
69 The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times, People's
Daily, Feb. 4, 1964, at 1-4, translated in P~ax= REViEw, Feb. 7, 1964, at 5, 9-10.
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The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 evoked the shrillest
Chinese condemnations. The Chinese press heaped scorn upon the
attempts of Soviet spokesmen to devise a "socialist," "internationalist"
fig-leaf that would "legalize" their government's action, which was
branded as both aggression and intervention. The theory that "his-
torical development" had made it appropriate to turn "national dicta-
torship" into "international dictatorship" in order to "'protect' the
[socialist] 'community'" was dismissed as a cloak for "revisionist
social-imperialist aggression" and "rapacious expansionist ambitions."
70
The related theory that "the interests of the community" represent
"the highest sovereignty" and must be put above the sovereignty of
the individual member-states, which is "limited," was characterized as
"gangster logic."171 The theory that "the Soviet Union . . . as a major
world power . . .cannot passively regard events that though they
might be territorially remote, nevertheless have a bearing on our secu-
rity and the security of our friends" was rejected as merely a refur-
bished version of the other fallacies.7 The USSR was also accused of
reformulating its definition of "aggression" so that armed encroach-
ment on countries with the same social system would not be regarded
as aggression but as action in defense of the system.7 8
What the USSR has done, the Chinese claimed, was to ape the im-
perialist governments by seeking to conceal its illegal interference in
the affairs of other countries amid "professions of humanity, justice and
virtue." 74 "U.S. imperialism invented the so-called 'free world com-
munity' and Soviet revisionism followed suit by concocting the so-
called 'community of socialist countries.' "I Chinese writers over-
looked any similarity between Soviet activities in Czechoslovakia and
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt, which the Chinese had
deemed consistent "with the spirit of solidarity and cooperation be-
tween brother countries." 76
70 Kung Chun-ping, The Theory of "International Dictatorship" Is A Gangster
Theory of Social-Imperialism, PENG Raviaw, May 16, 1969, at 4-9.
71 Theories of "Limited Sovereignty" and "International Dictatorship" Are Soviet
Revisionist Social-Imperialist Gangster Theories, PEKG RavIxw, mar. 28, 1969, at 23-25.72 Chien Yen, Tear Off the Wrappings From Soviet Revisionists Theory of "Re-
sponsibility for Security," PExIG Rxvmw, Sept. 3, 1969, at 20-22.
73 Wang Chao-tsai, Tear Off the Wrappings From the Soviet Revisionists "Definition
of Aggression," PF G RErIw, May 30, 1969, at 13-15.
74 Chien Yen, supra note 72.
75 Chi Hsiang-yang, Smash the New Tsars' Theory of "Limited Sovereignty,"
PEKIG REmVIw, May 23, 1969, at 20-22. Some American students of international law
have also noted the similarities in Soviet and American deeds and words. See, e.g.,
W. FRDmAN, 0. LlsszINvs & R. PuGH, supra note 9, at 1007.76 See text accompanying notes 40-50, 64-69 supra. The cases of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia might have been distinguished on the ground that in the latter case the
Soviet Union failed to provide convincing evidence that the existing government had
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V. CHINA'S INTERESTS ABROAD AND NON-INTERVENTION
What has thus far been said may lead the reader to believe that
China has been almost entirely concerned with forging the principle
of non-intervention into a defensive shield for fending off the depreda-
tions of all types of imperialism and that its only effort to legitimize
interference in the affairs of other countries was thrust upon it in the
1950's because of its embarrassing alliance with the Soviet Union.
Actually, of course, this is far from a complete picture of China's
position. Although the PRC, like previous Chinese regimes, has been
primarily preoccupied with problems at home, nevertheless it has
been deeply committed to influencing events abroad through a wide
range of actions that have inevitably raised questions about its view
of the law of intervention. The PRC's enthusiastic participation in
UN condemnations of the South African and Rhodesian governments
for abuses against their respective peoples, despite Peking's earlier
protests that UN condemnation of PRC conduct in Tibet constituted
intervention in China's domestic affairs,7 7 is only a recent illustration
of this commitment."'
On some occasions Peking has explicitly sought to reconcile its
attempts to influence events abroad with the principle of non-inter-
vention. For example, in 1959 China refused to accept the Indonesian
Foreign Minister's protest against the activities of Chinese diplomats
and consuls to protect overseas Chinese nationals against the dis-
criminatory measures adopted by the Indonesian Government. The
PRC claimed that it had always encouraged overseas Chinese to
abide by the laws of Indonesia and had never interfered in internal
affairs, but that it was obligated to protect the rights of the overseas
Chinese and that the execution of this obligation "can in no way be
interpreted as agitation to incite overseas Chinese to defy the orders of
the local government . . . .
requested the assistance of Soviet forces. Cf. W. FhnmmAxN, 0. LIssnmz & R. PuGiH,
supra note 9, at 1004.
7 7 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 35, 36 supra.
7 8 For example, soon after the arrival of the first PRC delegation to the UN,
Ambassador Huang Hua, China's permanent representative at the TIN, stated:
[T]he question of Southern Rhodesia involved the basic interests of five million
people of Zimbabwe. It involved the basic interests of the African people and
African countries. In accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and
the Charter, the United Nations and the Security Council were entitled to dis-
cuss, to intervene, to judge and to make decisions on that question.
Meeting of the Security Council, Dec. 30, 1971, 9 U.N. MoN7HLy CiRONicLx 56, 82
(1972). See also 9 id. 10, 14. The Peking Review reported that at the plenary meeting
of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1971, the Assembly, with Chinese support,
adopted nine resolutions condemning the apartheid policy of the South African regime.
China at the United Nations, PF=nG REviw, Dec. 10, 1971, at 23, 24.
7 9 Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's Letter of December 24 to Indonesian Foreign Minister,
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At the very height of the Cultural Revolution the PRC repeatedly
tried to pressure Switzerland into putting an end to the activities on
Swiss soil of refugee "Tibetan bandits." Far from expressing concern
that this might be construed as intervention in Swiss affairs, Peking
actually claimed that Swiss toleration of a "Tibetan Institute" con-
stituted "a gross intervention in the internal affairs of China." The
Chinese Government rationalized its charge by pointing out that:
[T~he [T]ibetan traitorous clique of [the] [D]alai
[Lama] which has fled China is the enemy of the Tibetan
and other nationalities of China. With the support of im-
perialism, revisionism and reaction, it is trying to accumu-
late its forces abroad and look for an opportunity to re-
establish the reactionary domination of the serf-owners
overthrown by the [T]ibetan people and to subject again
the liberated [T]ibetan people who are leading a happy
life to the dark and inhuman serfdom.80
Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, on only a few
occasions has China sought to influence events by sending troops
abroad. The Korean conflict brought the PRC its first involvement
in international warfare. Probably out of deference to the principle
of non-intervention, it maintained the fiction that it did not officially
participate, but merely permitted Chinese soldiers to "volunteer" for
service in Korea. Nevertheless, Peking was careful to argue that the
entry into the conflict of the Chinese People's Volunteers was an act
of self-defense, taken only after the Chinese had witnessed "Taiwan
fall prey to aggression and the flames of the United States war of
aggression against Korea leap towards them" as American forces ad-
vanced towards the Sino-Korean frontier. In these circumstances,
stated the chief PRC delegate to the UN Security Council meetings of
late 1950, there was "no reason whatever to prevent voluntary de-
parture for Korea to participate, under the command of the Government
of the Korean People's Democratic Republic . . .... " This was
"action not only to assist a neighbor, but to protect our own coun-
try.2)
82
Chinese forces withdrew from Korea in 1958, five years after
U.S. CoNsULATE GENERAL, HONG KONG, SURVEY OF THE CHINA MAINLAND PResS, Dec. 31,
1959, at 47-48. The letter did not distinguish between the PRC's right to protect over-
seas Chinese who are also Indonesian nationals and its right to protect overseas Chinese
who are not.
80 Foreign Ministry Protest to Swiss Government, Hsn=UA N-ws AGENcy, Aug. 18,
1967, at 21.
815 U.N. SCOR, 527 meeting 96 (1950).
82 Wu Hsiu-ch'uan's Speech Regarding the American Aggression on China, Dec. 16,
1950, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi [Collection of
Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, 1949-
1950] 219-37 (1957).
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an armistice was signed, and early in 1965, Chairman Mao proudly
affirmed that China had no troops outside its own frontiers. He said:
China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight.
' . . Fighting beyond one's own borders was criminal. Why
should the Chinese do that? The Vietnamese could cope with
their situation.
...China gave support to revolutionary movements but
not by sending troops. Of course, whenever a liberation strug-
gle existed China would publish statements and call demon-
strations to support it. It was precisely that which vexed the
imperialists.
8 3
Shortly afterward, however, the United States began to carry
out air strikes against North Vietnam. The Chinese Government
promptly declared that this constituted a flagrant violation of the
Geneva agreements of 1954 relating to Indo-China, that therefore
"the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has gained the right of action
to fight against U.S. aggression, and all the other countries upholding
the Geneva Agreements have gained the right of action to assist the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in its fight against aggression."
Ominously, the statement went on to note that China had adhered to
the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference, that the
Chinese and Vietnamese are "the closest of brothers," that aggression
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) "means aggres-
sion against China," and that the Chinese people "will definitely not
stand idly by."84 Following the introduction of large-scale American
combat forces in Vietnam, China sent from 30,000 to 50,000 regular
members of the People's Liberation Army to North Vietnam, where,
with the consent of the DRV, they engaged in construction work and
manned anti-aircraft defenses" until their reported withdrawal in
1969. Chinese troops were subsequently reported to be building roads
in Laotian territory controlled by the Pathet Lao, in accordance with
an old cooperation agreement between Laos and China.86
VI. SuPpoRT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
As noted above,8 7 Chairman Mao has stated that what vexes "the
imperialists" is not the dispatch of Chinese troops abroad but China's
83 Snow, Interview with Mao, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1965, at 17, 22.
84 China is Well Prepared to Assist D.R.V. Against US. Aggression, PEKING REVIEW,
Feb. 12, 1965, at 6-7.
8 5 Whiting, How We Almost Went to War with China, LooK, Apr. 29, 1969, at
76, 77.
8 6 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
87 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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support for "liberation struggles." With the deepening of the Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960's, Peking increasingly sought to portray "Mao
Tse-tung's thought" as the beacon that illuminates the revolutionary
road of the oppressed peoples of the world. On the 50th anniversary
of the Bolshevik revolution the principal Chinese Communist journals
asserted that the "center of world revolution" had shifted from Mos-
cow to Peking.s8
The strategy of waging revolutionary warfare that Chairman
Mao has offered the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America is known as "people's war." Based on sup-
posedly universal elements in the Chinese Communist Party's own
experience in attaining power, "people's war," as articulated in Lin
Piao's famous elaboration, calls for: leadership by a revolutionary
communist party that analyzes conditions and makes policy according
to Marxist-Leninist precepts; mobilization by the party of the broad
masses in a "united front" policy that supports protracted war against
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism; reliance upon the
peasantry and establishment of rural bases under party leadership;
creation of a party-led army that is imbued with "proletarian revolu-
tionary consciousness and courage" and actively seeks the support of
the masses; resort to Mao's strategy and tactics for gradually moving
from mass mobilization and guerrilla warfare to mobile and even po-
sitional warfare as the revolution progresses; and adherence to a
policy of self-reliance which recognizes that "[r] evolution or people's
war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and
should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other
way."2
8 9
In the statement quoted above,"0 Chairman Mao gave the impres-
sion that China's support for liberation struggles consists of publish-
ing statements and calling demonstrations in China. Although Lin Piao
agreed that no revolution can be exported, he claimed that, unlike "the
Khrushchev revisionists," the Chinese "invariably" fulfill their "inter-
nationalist duty" to give the revolutionary wars of oppressed nations
and peoples "firm support and active aid."91 Huang Hua, China's per-
manent representative at the UN, recently said that China offers
political, moral, and physical aid to African liberation movements.
9 2
No Chinese leader has spelled out the scope and nature of this aid.
88 Mohr, Peking Says Mao is Today's Lenin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1967, at 10, col. 1.
8 9 Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War, PEXING REviw, Sept. 3, 1965,
at 9-19. For discussion of the Mao-Lin theory, see P. VANr Nms, REvoL roN AND
CHINSE FoREiGx POLICy 50-73 (1970).
90 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
9 1 Lin Piao, supra note 89, at 28.
9 2
Chinese Envoy, Japan Times (Kyodo-Reuter dispatch from Khartoum), Feb. 8,
1972, at 4.
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The Chinese Communists have not tried to conceal their ideologi-
cal and psychological support for foreign revolutionaries, including
non-communist revolutionaries. In addition to continuously issuing
militant propaganda that advocates revolution against oppression
everywhere, the Chinese have on many occasions implicitly or explic-
itly endorsed revolution in specific countries and have sometimes en-
dorsed particular revolutionary organizations. Implicit endorsement
has taken the form of reprinting policy statements of foreign revolu-
tionary movements in the Chinese press, reporting news of their ac-
tivities or publishing maps that designate certain countries as sites of
liberation struggles. Explicit endorsement has consisted of statements
by Chairman Mao, other leaders or the Communist Party itself.Y3
Peking has sought to export this ideological and psychological
support to selected countries by disseminating translations of the
works of Chairman Mao and other leaders, local language periodicals
and radio broadcasts, and symbols of revolution such as Mao badges.
It has also attempted to influence local media and to use cultural
exchange as a propaganda instrument. China's public support has in-
cluded playing host to representatives of foreign revolutionary orga-
nizations. It has even allowed some of these to establish permanent
diplomatic-type missions in Peking, such as the Office of the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the South Vietnamese NLF Mission. 4
The latter, after the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam was proclaimed, was declared to be the
official embassy of the new government. 5 And since 1970 the PRC
has permitted Prince Sihanouk to operate his Cambodian government-
in-exile from Peking."
The PRC's military and economic support for wars of national
liberation has generally been covert. The Chinese have apparently
shipped arms, ammunition, and other military supplies to a variety of
movements. They reportedly have given military training and advice
to certain prospective revolutionaries, both in China and abroad, and
have financed the organization and maintenance of some revolutionary
groups. Following the successful precedent of its aid to the Vietminh,
China has provided sanctuary to guerrilla forces acting in selected
countries on its periphery, and it has permitted a number of insurgent
organizations in neighboring Southeast Asian countries to operate
radio stations from Chinese soil. Several governments in Asia and
93 See the excellent discussion in P. VAN NEss, supra note 89, at 81-89.
94J. HsIuo, supra note 3, at 221.
95 See P. VAN NEss, supra note 89, at 130.
96See text accompanying notes 113-16 infra.
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Africa have also alleged that Peking has abetted political assassination
and engaged in political bribery. 7
Yet most observers agree that, apart from rhetoric, the level of
Chinese support for revolutionary activities abroad has in fact been
quite low and that the degree of success attained has been even lower.9 8
China is a poor, vast, developing country that is beset by the political,
economic, social, and administrative problems confronting all develop-
ing countries and thus has limited resources to allocate to foreign lib-
eration struggles. Beyond that, however, even in promising situations
in geographically contiguous countries, China has frequently failed to
give even verbal support to local revolutionary groups. Prior to the
Cultural Revolution, China refrained from endorsing wars of national
liberation in Third World countries with which it had established dip-
lomatic relations; only governments that rebuffed Peking's overtures
became possible targets for Chinese-sponsored revolution. It was a
government's foreign policy, rather than the nature of its rule at home,
that determined the PRC's behavior toward it.9
Largely for reasons of domestic politics, during the early years
of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1967) China's leaders sought to
make PRC foreign policy adhere more closely to Maoist revolutionary
theory, although their material aid to revolution did not match their
revolutionary rhetoric. As the Cultural Revolution subsided, however,
the PRC gradually began to revert to the foreign politics of national
interest that it had previously practiced. China's 1971 support of the
feudal, militaristic government of Pakistan, rather than the war of
liberation waged by the oppressed people of Bangla Desh, made this
transparent to the world. 00
97 For an illustrative account of the range of PRC efforts to support wars of national
liberation, see J. CorN & HUNGDAH CnHi, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHA AND
ITEATIONAL LAw: A DocumENTARY STUDy, ch. 9 (1974). For a useful case study,
see J. ZAsLorr, THE ROLE oP THE SANcTuARY nT INsuRGENcy: COMMUNIST CHINA S
SUPPORT TO THE VIETMInH, 1946-1954 (1967).
98 See, e.g., Robinson, Peking's Revolutionary Strategy in the Developing World:
The Failures of Success, AsNAwS, Nov. 1969, at 64; Whiting, The Use of Force in Foreign
Policy by the People's Republic of China, id., July 1972, at 36; J. Hsr=mo, supra note 3,
at 288, 292-93; Ryan, The Decline of the "Armed Struggle" Tactic In Chinese Foreign
Policy, 10 CuxaNT Scmm, Dec. 1972, at 1.
99 p. VA1 Nass, supra note 89, at 166-97.
loo An article in the Peking Review stated that "the so-called 'Bangla Desh' is simply
a plot of the Indian government to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan ... .
Indian Reactionaries Launch Armed Aggression Against Pakistan, PEINo REvmw,
Dec. 10, 1971, at 13. For years India had charged that Pakistan had been allowing
Chinese military experts to train and arm Indian rebels on East Pakistani soil. See, e.g.,
Reports Say Mizo Rebels Asking Chinese Aid, Foreign Broadcast Information'Service,
Aug. 21, 1967, at 1 (U.S.).
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VII. RECONCMING NON-INTERVENTION WITH WARS OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION
To the extent that Peking does support liberation struggles, the
question arises as to how its fulfillment of this "internationalist duty"
can be consistent with the principle of non-intervention that it has
espoused. Both the USSR and the United States also have attempted
to subvert existing governments, but to differing degrees they have
been more reluctant than China to acknowledge their support for vio-
lent political change and to confront the question openly. For example,
because of its felt inability to offer legal justification for overt ef-
forts to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba in 1961 and the Arbenz
regime in Guatemala in 1954, the United States attempted to act
covertly in those cases. 101 Although the Soviet Union, like China, pro-
vides support to selected wars of national liberation, Moscow was
slower than Peking publicly to advocate it, and only after the down-
fall of Khrushchev and the bruising polemic with Peking over the
meaning of peaceful coexistence did Soviet publicists begin explicitly
to claim that such aid does not violate modern international law.
02
Yet in their capacity as government officials China's leaders too
have generally avoided publicly facing up to this basic problem of
international law. Because of this, it has been possible for political
scientists to write excellent studies of Peking's support for wars of
national liberation without ever explicitly dealing with the legal as-
pects.0 3 Nevertheless, in their capacity as Chinese Communist Party
officials engaged in bitter debate with the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union,10 China's leaders have devoted a great deal of attention
to reconciling their aid to wars of national liberation with their en-
dorsement of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Indeed, Khrush-
chev's sensitivity to the contradiction seemingly inherent in supporting
both revolution and non-intervention drew heavy Chinese fire. For ex-
ample, Chinese ideologists charged in a major editorial attack in late
1963 that "he regards the anti-imperialist struggles of the socialist
countries and of the people of the world as incompatible with the
policy of peaceful coexistence." Khrushchev was sacrificing "the pro-
letarian internationalist task of helping the revolutionary struggles of
101 For an account of the United States' efforts to subvert "undesirable govern-
ments," including those of Cuba and Guatemala, see R. BAR~NETr, INTERWNTION AND
REVOL TION 17, 229-36 (1963). Regarding the "Bay of Pigs," see, e.g., R. Hmsmm, To
MovE A NATION 30-34 (1967).
102 See 3. HsuNnG, supra note 3, at 53, 68.
10 3 See generally P. VAN NEss, supra note 89; Robinson, supra note 98.
104For a review of the 1963-1967 polemics, see J. GmnTas, SumvEY oF Tm Snqo-
SoviaT DisPuTE (1968).
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the oppressed peoples and nations" upon the altar of peaceful coexis-
tence, they maintained. The true view of peaceful coexistence, a con-
cept which they claimed to favor, is that "intrinsically" imperialism
is unwilling to accept it, and insists on committing aggression and sup-
pressing oppressed peoples; therefore, they stated, the socialist coun-
tries, together with the people of all other countries, must wage "a
tit-for-tat struggle against imperialism."'0 5
Thus the argument maintained in this editorial and a series of
Party documents 01 was that socialist states should apply peaceful co-
existence, including the principle of non-intervention, in their relations
with non-socialist states except when dealing with imperialist states.
Because the latter do not respect the rule of non-intervention and the
other principles of peaceful coexistence but suppress oppressed peo-
ples, according to this theory, the socialist states are free to, indeed
are obligated to, go to the defense of the oppressed peoples by sup-
porting liberation struggles. It is this "tit-for-tat" collective self-
defense theory that the Chinese rely on to demonstrate that there is
no inconsistency in a state's striving for peaceful coexistence while
simultaneously supporting revolution.
A prominent Chinese legal scholar bolstered the theory of party
ideologists by applying it to concrete cases. Responding to Secretary
of State Dean Rusk's speech at the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law in 1965,107 Fu Chu rejected the argu-
ment that the theory and practice of wars of national liberation under-
mine international law and that support for such wars constitute
aggression. Liberation struggles, he wrote, are "wars of national self-
defense conducted by colonized or semi-colonized states or nations to
preserve their own sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial
integrity." Because they are waged against imperialist aggression, they
are "just wars and are fully consistent with modern international law."
Indeed, as in the case of Vietnam, they represent "an important con-
tribution to the preservation and development of international law."
Fu Chu sought to button up his case by invoking American history:
[Tihe American war of independence against England in the
eighteenth century received strong support and aid from
105 Peaceful Coexistence-Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, People's Daily, Dec.
12, 1963, at 1-4, translated in PEXNGREVIEw, Dec. 20, 1963, at 9-14.
106 See Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Comment on the Letter of
March 30, 1963, from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, June 14, 1963, in Kuan-yii kuo-chi kung-ch'an chu-yi yun-tung tsung-lu-hsien
te chien-yi ho yu-kuan wen-chien [Comments on the General Line of the International
Communist Movement and Related Documents] 33 (Peking ed. 1963); Lin Piao, supra
note 89, at 28.
107 The speech is printed in A. Soc' INT'L L. PROC. 247-55 (1968).
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foreign states. Frenchmen and many [other] Europeans even
organized voluntary forces to assist the American people in
resisting English colonialists. According to Rusk's "interna-
tional law," French people and people of other countries aid-
ing the American war of independence at that time not only
committed aggression against America but also threatened
and committed aggression against England. What an absurd
conclusion this is. The American people will never agree with
Rusk's absurd theory.'
Despite the efforts of Chinese ideologists and publicists to justify
the position that state assistance to foreign wars of national liberation
does not violate the rule of non-intervention, the state practice of the
PRC reflects awareness of the fact that most of the world community's
member states remain unpersuaded. Rather than officially, explicitly,
and consistently maintain its minority position in both practice and
theory, the Chinese Government has often employed a variety of tac-
tics to avoid the problem created by its challenge to accepted inter-
national legal principles.
We have already seen that the PRC, like other intervening states,
generally seeks to conceal the scope and nature of its military and
economic aid to revolutionary movements. This has been done in ob-
vious deference to the principle of non-intervention. For example,
when in 1964 Kwame Nkrumah permitted Chinese guerrilla warfare
instructors to enter Ghana for the purpose of training nationals of
other African states in the arts of revolutionary warfare, the Chinese
embassy insisted upon secrecy; according to a report published by the
post-Nkrumah government, the embassy had said secrecy was neces-
sary "in view of the delicate nature of the instructors' assignment in
Ghana and also in view of the various allegations by the imperialists
that China was encouraging subversion in certain countries."'' 1
It is interesting to note how the PRC handled the post-Nkrumah
government's charges that the training of saboteurs in Ghana consti-
tuted intervention in the affairs of other African states. Peking re-
sponded only to the extent that it was possible to offer a plausible
justification for the presence of the instructors under traditional inter-
national law. It dismissed the essential charges as "absurd slander"
and stated:
As is well known, the military experts as well as the economic
and technical experts sent by the Chinese Government to
work in Ghana were dispatched at the request of the govern-
1
08 Fu Chu, Rusk's "International Law" Cannot Conceal the Crime of Aggression
Against Vietnam by American Imperialism, 1965(2) Po cAx.-LE.A. REsEA_.cH 8-11.
109 GHmNA MnIIITRY Or INFO.ATION, Nxwrmn' s SuBvERsIoN 3w AiwRIcA 7-8.
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ment of the Republic of Ghana and in pursuance of the rele-
vant agreements signed by the two countries. They always
worked in accordance with the arrangements made by the
Ghanaian Government. They are beyond reproach: No one
can succeed in distorting all these facts."'
The PRC has frequently sought to resolve the tension inherent in
supporting both revolution and non-intervention by resort to such
techniques. In 1966, for example, it rejected Indian protests against
Chinese radio broadcasts, asserting:
It is entirely within China's sovereign rights for the Chinese
frontier guards stationing [sic] at Natu La on the Chinese-
Sikkim boundary to make broadcasts on Chinese territory
advocating the friendship between the Chinese and Indian
peoples and setting forth the truth about the Sino-Indian
boundary question, and no foreigner has any right to inter-
fere in this.'
The Foreign Ministry denied Indian charges that the broadcasts had
called upon the Indian Army to revolt against its government. Thus,
as in the Ghanaian case, the PRC attempted to impose a pattern upon
the facts that made it possible to defend its actions in accepted inter-
national legal terms. Similarly, when in 1971 Uganda claimed that
Chinese Communist instructors had participated in guerrilla warfare
that had been launched against Uganda from Tanzania, the Chinese
charge d'affaires branded the charges an utterly groundless fabrica-
tion that gravely undermined relations between China and Uganda.1
2
The recent case of Cambodia illustrates the PRC's resort to the
device of seeking to legitimize support to insurgents by taking advan-
tage of the discretion which individual states enjoy in deciding whether
and when to recognize the insurgents as the legitimate government." 3
In 1970 Prince Sihanouk claimed that, following the military coup
that deposed him, the PRC granted him a loan to finance his Peking-
based government-in-exile and free weapons and transport facilities
110 Chinese Embassy in Ghana Refutes Ghana's Slander, U.S. CoNsuLArE GZmm,
HONG KONG, SURVEY OF THE CHINA MAINlAIND PRESS, Mar. 23, 1966, at 22, 23.
"'l Chinese Foreign Ministry Refutes Indian Government's Slanders, PEKING REviEw,
Sept. 23, 1966, at 36.
112 Chinese Charge d'Affaires ai. in Uganda Lodges Protest, PEKINo REv:Ew,
July 30, 1971, at 29. It is difficult, of course, for academic observers and the public to
determine which of the many charges of Chinese intervention are well-grounded. In
Africa, for example, "Peking was implicated in several insurgencies and attempted coups,
as in Rwanda, Niger, Cameroon, and Zaire, which gained the Chinese a reputation for
subversion." Ryan, supra note 98, at 9. Yet this hardly means that all such accusations,
including Uganda's, are necessarily factual.
113 For a discussion of this device, see W. FRia -rANN, THE CHHiNG Saucruat
oP ITERNATiONAL LAw, 265-66 (1964).
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for the fight that his supporters have been waging in Cambodia. The
Prince quoted Chairman Mao as having said, "We are not arms traf-
fickers. We cannot sell you weapons. We can give them to you. As for
transport, that's also free."' 14 Sihanouk subsequently signed an agree-
ment with the PRC for providing free military aid to his regime.115
These obviously authorized revelations represent an exception to the
usual Chinese practices--designed to insulate Peking from charges of
international delinquency-of attempting to conceal the extension of
military and economic aid to specific liberation struggles and denying
accusations of having extended such aid. It should be noted, however,
that the PRC had continued to recognize Sihanouk as the chief of the
Cambodian state and that the Prince made his announcements only
after the Chinese Government had formally recognized "The Royal
Government of National Union Under the Leadership of the National
United Front of Kampuchea" as the legal successor to the previous
government of Cambodia." 6 Thus China was aiding what it claimed
to be the legitimate government at the latter's request, bringing the
case, at least to Peking's satisfaction, within the traditional, if contro-
versial, ambit of international law and state practice.1
7
One of the more tongue-in-cheek Chinese rejoinders to an accusa-
tion of intervention was made shortly after the Bandung Conference
of 1955. At the conference the Prime Minister of Ceylon had proposed
that the PRC call upon the Communist parties in Asian and African
states to disband. The People's Daily responded: "By demanding that
China call on Communist parties in the region to disband, the Ceylon-
ese Prime Minister-who had voiced opposition to every form of
outside interference-was inviting China to interfere in Ceylon's in-
ternal affairs." It stated that "[w]hen there are people in a country
who believe in Communism, a Communist party will appear. This is
an internal question of the country concerned."" 8 This expressed
solicitude for the principle of non-intervention must have been wryly
received by those states in which the Chinese Communist Party had
been offering propaganda, indoctrination, military training, supplies
114 N.Y. Times, June 7, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
115 Government of PRC and Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia
Sign in Peking Agreement on Providing Gratuitous Military Aid by China to Cambodia,
U.S. CONSuLATE GENERAL, HONG KoNG, SuRVEY or Tm CHINA AWNIAD PREss, Aug. 26,
1970, at 79.
116 Chinese Government Formally Recognizes Royal Government of National Union
of Cambodia, PENG REvmw, May 14, 1970, at 14; N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1970, at 14,
col. 4.
1
1 7 See text accompanying note 9 supra. For discussion of Chinas premature recog-
nition of the revolutionary Algerian regime, see J. HsruNG, supra note 3, at 220-21.
118 N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1955, at 7, col. 1.
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and other support to local Communist parties that were bent upon
revolution. 119
Peking's public endorsements of particular revolutionary move-
ments have generally reflected tacit formal deference to the principle
of non-intervention. None of the techniques of implicit endorsement
-reprinting the policy statements of foreign revolutionary groups,
issuing news reports about their activities or publishing maps that
designate countries as sites of ongoing struggles-implicates the PRC
officially. Moreover, as the leading study of the subject points out:
[E]xplicit endorsements usually are made in the name of
either the Chinese people or the Chinese Communist Party.
The Chinese government, as such, does not customarily en-
dorse revolutions, since its formal activities with regard to
foreign affairs are generally limited to relations with other
governments, rather than with mass organizations or political
parties. °20
It should be noted that since early 1959, even an endorsement by
Mao Tse-tung has not constituted official support for revolution
abroad, for at that time Mao gave up his post as head of state and has
subsequently served only as chairman of the Party and as a deputy to
the National People's Congress. Perhaps significantly, although many
of the highest-ranking Chinese officials, as well as publicists, have fre-
quently proclaimed the PRC's adherence to "the five principles of
peaceful coexistence," and the state has bound itself to their obser-
vance on many occasions, Chairman Mao himself seldom appears to
have advocated non-intervention. Often when he has referred to the
principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty, he has been silent about non-intervention.
At times, he has even coupled advocacy of the other principles with
vague but broad exhortations to give active support to liberation strug-
gles. 2' Mao's statements contrast in their emphasis with those of the
highest Soviet officials, such as Khrushchev, who have frequently en-
dorsed non-intervention.
If in practice the PRC were consistently to take the position that
state assistance to foreign wars of national liberation does not violate
the principle of non-intervention, it might spare itself the tasks of
119 1For example, see the summary of the complex relationship between the Chinese
Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party in the years 1949-1954 in S. Frrz-
rxm, CmnnA AND T3E OvEasEAS CHInEsE 89-98 (1972). See also H. HIMroN, Commu-
NIST CHINA ni WoLn Por.rics 403-04 (1966); Ryan, supra note 98, at 2-7.
120 p. VAN NEss, supra note 89, at 86-87, which also discusses exceptions.
121 See note 2 supra. For one of Mao's relatively rare endorsements of all five of
the principles of peaceful coexistence, see Mao-tse-tung tung-chih-te chiang-hua [Comrade
Mao Tse-tung's Talk], People's Daily, Nov. 7, 1957, at 1-2.
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concealing its military and economic support for liberation struggles;
of denying that it has extended this covert support; of structuring
much of its public support for such struggles in ways that diminish
the involvement of the government, as distinguished from the press,
the Party, and the people; and of justifying in terms of traditional
international law the support that the Chinese Government has pub-
licly provided. Yet the PRC has thus far failed to adopt this straight-
forward, if highly controversial position, apparently because it recog-
nizes that this position is unacceptable to most states and because it
needs their cooperation not only in respecting the rule of non-inter-
vention vis-h-vis China but also in pursuing many positive goals.
IX. CONCLUSION
As a result of this introductory survey, one wonders to what ex-
tent contemporary Chinese theory and practice relating to intervention
are significantly different from what they were 2,500 years ago. Today's
Chinese elite, like that of the feudal states of the pre-imperial era,
endorses the general rule of non-intervention and adheres to it when
convenient. Yet, like their Chou dynasty ancestors, the Chinese Com-
munists find it politically expedient frequently to depart from the
norm, they have developed ethical doctrines that preach the desir-
ability of such departures, and, with the aid of their scholars, they
have articulated specific legal rationalizations for most of those de-
partures. Some of these contemporary rationalizations, such as those
that justify intervention in self-defense or in behalf of the oppressed
people of another state, had actual counterparts in ancient China.
Nevertheless, despite the broad similarities and despite the fact that
China's pre-imperial experience may in the nineteenth century have
helped an historically conscious elite to understand the multi-state
system of the West, that ancient Chinese experience does not seem to
have influenced the PRC's view of intervention. Nor does the record
suggest that the imperial Chinese tribute system has had a significant
impact upon Peking's position.
This is not to say that historical and cultural factors have played
no role in shaping contemporary Chinese attitudes towards interven-
tion. These attitudes reflect not only China's current position as a
nation-state but also the breakdown of the imperial tribute system and
the consequent century of foreign domination. That in turn led to a
preoccupation with China's defense, the adoption of a Marxist-
Leninist world-outlook, the development of a successful revolutionary
organization in semi-colonial conditions, and the specific importation
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of the Soviet intellectual apparatus of international law. From all these
materials new China's leaders have fashioned their own distinctive
view of intervention. That view offers a sometimes distorted but often
devastating attack upon the hypocrisy of the Western powers and,
more recently, the USSR in formulating and applying the rules of the
game.
Yet, at least for the present period, when it is unable to gain
broad international acceptance of its legal justification of state support
for foreign wars of national liberation, the PRC has itself proved no
stranger to hypocrisy. It has not been candid about its military and
economic aid to many liberation struggles. Despite its professed con-
cern for the control of intervention, the norms that it has articulated
are not susceptible of objective application. Nor has Peking shown
interest in strengthening international institutions to which China and
other states might surrender their present unilateral fact-finding and
norm-applying powers in intervention-type situations.
What the PRC has done is to demonstrate its ability to play the
dangerous game of intervention in international politics with the same
facility as the other major players. It can tailor the facts and ma-
nipulate the rules to rationalize, at least to its own satisfaction, what-
ever position seems to be in the immediate interest of the Chinese
state. When foreign military forces are introduced to help restore
order at the request of the existing government, Peking can brand the
action legitimate or illegitimate, according to its own perception of
"the genuine desires" of the people. If it is a question of UN con-
demnation of regimes that engage in racial discrimination and sup-
press national self-determination, the PRC has no difficulty finding
that article 2 (7) of the Charter does not bar UN action in behalf of
the people of South Africa but precludes it in behalf of the people of
Tibet. China can lecture Britain about its obligation not to allow
Hong Kong to become a base for hostile activities, while simulta-
neously offering sanctuary and support to guerrilla movements that
threaten neighboring states. Despite its repeated pledges not to emulate
the super-powers, the PRC has learned the fundamental lesson of
super-power international law-it all depends on whose ox is gored.
Should one be depressed by this? Things could be worse. China's
situation is changing in ways that are not devoid of hope for inter-
national progress. In his classic reformulation of the Maoist revolu-
tionary credo, Lin Piao stated:
It is sheer day-dreaming for anyone to think that, since our
revolution has been victorious, our national construction is
forging ahead, our national wealth is increasing and our living
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conditions are improving, we too will lose our revolutionary
fighting will, abandon the cause of world revolution and dis-
card Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.122
But Lin Piao is no longer the heir apparent, and China now enjoys
moderate leadership-for how long we cannot predict.
China's current moderation is likely to be encouraged by a num-
ber of factors. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it should be recalled,
the PRC, like imperial China vis-4-vis its tributaries, did not intervene
in the affairs of regimes that accepted its legitimacy. The impetus
behind Peking's support for wars of national liberation has been its
anti-status quo orientation, and that in turn has derived in important
part from the refusal of the United States and its satellites to recognize
the PRC's legitimacy. Now, however, Peking has achieved its rightful
place in the UN and is completing the process of establishing bilateral
diplomatic relations with other states. This emergence from the twilight
of the world community should nourish the modest degree of sensitivity
that the PRC has already shown to charges of intervention, par-
ticularly when made by "Third World" states. It should also increase
the benefits that can accrue to Peking from satisfactory intercourse
with other governments rather than with groups that strive to over-
throw them.23
Both before and after the Cultural Revolution, Peking demon-
strated that the interests of the Chinese state normally take precedence
over the interests of world revolution. Peking's number one goal, apart
from maintaining the regime in power, is the reintegration of Taiwan
into China and the preservation of China's territorial integrity. The
12 2 Lin Piao, supra note 89, at 28.
123 After these words were written, the author read the recent article by Ryan,
supra note 98, which describes the "new order of priorities" that since the end of the
Cultural Revolution has led the PRC to diminish its tangible support to revolutionary
organizations. Ryan's summary, supra note 98, at 2, is worth quoting:
China's leaders, spurred by the sudden respectability and larger opportuni-
ties of membership in the United Nations, sought status, prestige and, above all,
influence in the international arena-goals more likely to be achieved by courting
the "independent and sovereign states" . . . than by fomenting "people's revolu-
tionary armed struggles."
.The Maoists continue to call for world revolution, but in a different frame-
work. Peking has muted the "armed struggle" line in many areas, at least
temporarily, to gain sympathy and support for its policy objectives. The Chinese
Communist Party has not abandoned its claim to be the source of inspiration,
respository of the true Marxist faith and most suitable model for the revolu-
tionary forces of the world, nor has it ceased to provide verbal encouragement
and round-the-clock exhortation via its extensive propaganda machinery to
"revolutionary masses" outside China. Radio Peking, the New China News
Agency (NCNA) and the Foreign Languages Press operate full tilt, but their
output is designed more to secure immediate psychological and ideological
benefits for China than to bring down non-Communist governments. Practically
speaking, Chinese support for armed struggle by revolutionary groups has dwin-
dled to what one observer has called "a few selected insurgencies."
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moral that Bangla Desh must have driven home to the Chinese leaders
is that the doctrine of liberation struggle may frustrate the attain-
ment of that goal. In the months before Bangla Desh was established,
the favorite Chinese slogan was: "Countries want independence, na-
tions want liberation and the people want revolution." 124 The Chinese
Nationalist government on Taiwan may prevent the people there from
hearing this slogan, but its implications have undoubtedly not been
lost upon their kinsmen and supporters abroad, especially after the
precedent set by Bangla Desh. The people on Taiwan-and for that
matter, the people of Tibet and other peripheral areas of China-can
also invoke the historical example of the American war of indepen-
dence in an effort to justify breaking away from China with foreign
support. This situation may give the PRC, which has always been
deeply concerned about its security, tangible incentive to reconsider
the balance of advantage with respect to intervention in a swiftly
changing, uncertain international environment.
Perhaps the PRC's entry into the UN will offer a way for Peking
persuasively to reconcile support for selected foreign insurgencies with
its proclaimed devotion to non-intervention. As has already been noted,
in recent years the UN General Assembly has adopted a number of
resolutions recommending that all states extend "moral and material
assistance" to insurgent movements that seek to liberate the peoples
of the white-dominated regimes of southern Africa;' 25 and, following
its entry into the UN, the PRC has enthusiastically joined in similar
Assembly efforts.' 26 Interestingly, in recent years also the PRC has
ceased publicly supporting armed struggle in African states that are
ruled by black regimes and has confined at least its public support
for revolution in Africa to the areas of white rule. 7 This suggests
the possibility, as China continues its current policy of mobilizing
the middle-sized and smaller states against the superpowers, that not
only in Africa but also on other continents the Assembly might
authorize aiding those selective insurgencies that Peking wishes to
foster. If this should prove to be the case, because of such collective
legitimation the actions taken pursuant to the resolutions would pre-
sumably not constitute illegal intervention. By limiting its support
for liberation struggles to those approved by the Assembly, China
would thus be able to maintain its Maoist revolutionary credentials
124 See, e.g., Speech by Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Chairman of Delegation of People's Re-
public of China, Nov. 15, 1971, PEKMG R vIEw, Nov. 19, 1971, at 5, 6.
125 See, e.g., note 11 supra & accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., note 78 supra & accompanying text.
127 See Ryan, supra note 98, at 8-9.
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and to seek desired changes in selected countries while still not
alienating most members of the world community.
Is it unrealistic to foresee such a turn of events? Much may
depend on whether the superpowers, which have engaged in interven-
tion on a scale never approached by the PRC, indicate a readiness to
undertake a cooperative effort to curb intervention from all quarters,
including their own. To an extent that we often fail to appreciate,
Chinese attitudes toward international law represent reactions to the
behavior of other states rather than initiatives. Until convinced that
the other great powers are prepared to take the rules more seriously
than in the past, the PRC too will continue to regard international
law as an instrument of policy to be used when useful, to be adapted
when desirable, and to be ignored when necessary.
